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Many studies have shown that ﬁnancial development plays an important role in promoting economic
growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1996; Levine, 2005). However, compared with Western countries, the security
market in China is less developed and the ﬁnancial system is dominated by the banking sector (Chen et al.,
2013; Gou et al., 2014). Under these conditions, bank loans are major sources of corporate ﬁnancing, even
for large public companies. For instance, the average ratio of the volume of bank loan ﬁnancing to GDP from
1990 to 2008 in China was 82.4%, and the average ratios of equity volume and bond ﬁnancing to GDP were
only 0.81% and 0.76%, respectively.1 In fact, even in the United States, the volume of bank loan ﬁnancing is
much larger than that of equity and bond ﬁnancing combined. Given the economic signiﬁcance of bank loans
in allocating capital to corporations, considerable eﬀort has been made to investigate the determinants of bank
loan contracting (e.g., Qian and Strahan, 2007; Graham et al., 2008; Chava et al., 2009; Hasan et al., 2012; Ge
et al., 2012). Diﬀerent from the current literature, this study focuses on the eﬀect of CFO gender on bank–ﬁrm
relationships and attempts to explore whether and how female CFOs exert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
designing of bank loan terms.
Over the past decade, the number of female executives (especially female CFOs) has increased dramati-
cally.2 As their education levels and social status improve, female executives are playing an increasingly impor-
tant role in corporate decisions. The signiﬁcant increase in female CFOs has also attracted considerable
attention from academics. An emerging stream of literature is beginning to investigate the systematic diﬀer-
ences between male and female CFOs in terms of their accounting, ﬁnancing and investment decisions
(Francis et al., 2013). For example, studies have indicated that ﬁrms with female CFOs adopt more conserva-
tive accounting policies (Francis et al., 2014), are less likely to manipulate earnings (Chava and Purnanandam,
2010; Liu et al., 2015) and are less likely to make signiﬁcant acquisitions but more likely to decrease leverage
levels than ﬁrms with male CFOs (Huang and Kisgen, 2013).
In the bank loan literature, accounting information is an important standard that banks rely on to assess
borrowers’ credit risk. Earlier studies ﬁnd that when banks initiate private debt, they are very sensitive to var-
ious accounting information attributes, such as operating accruals (Bharath et al., 2008) and conservatism
(Sunder et al., 2009; Zhang, 2008). Assuming that female CFOs are more likely to report high-quality and con-
servative earnings than male CFOs, as documented in earlier studies, banks should realize the beneﬁts of
female CFOs in providing more reliable and conservative accounting information to lenders (Francis et al.,
2014) and thus reward borrowers under the control of female CFOs with favorable loan terms.
However, ﬁnance studies have long suggested the notion of credit discrimination, which indicates that dis-
crimination in the credit market occurs when the decisions lenders make in relation to loan applications are
inﬂuenced by personal characteristics that are not relevant to the transactions, such as the gender or race of
the top executives of the borrowing ﬁrm. In the classical model adopted by Becker (1957), discrimination
arises due to the taste-based preferences of the lender, who is willing to pay a price to avoid being associated
with certain groups of borrowers. Alesina et al. (2013) provide evidence that female-managed ﬁrms are less
likely than their male-managed counterparts to obtain bank loans and are charged higher interest rates when
loan applications are approved. Similar results are presented by Bellucci et al. (2010), who ﬁnd that female
entrepreneurs face tighter credit availability. Thus, the presence of credit discrimination against women reveals
that banks may charge higher loan prices and require stricter non-price terms when lending to female-CFO-led
companies.
An important implication of the preceding discussion is that female CFOs may not necessarily obtain
favorable or unfavorable loan contracts. Therefore, the direction of the relationship between the two remains
an open empirical question. The main purpose of this study is to explore whether and how CFO gender inﬂu-
ences the designing of collateral clauses in bank loan contracts. Examining this issue in the Chinese setting is
interesting and important for several reasons. First, bank loans are a major source of external ﬁnancing in1 Data source: http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/html/kuangjia.htm?id=2013s01.htm.
2 For example, among the major U.S. corporations in 2005, 7.5% of chief ﬁnancial oﬃcers (CFOs) and 1.5% of chief executive oﬃcer
(CEOs) were women, versus 3.0% and 0.5% in 1994, respectively. According to Grant Thornton’s ‘‘Report on International Business
Questionnaire,” the ratio of female executives in Chinese companies was about 25%, an amount larger than the global average (21%).
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and the designing of bank loan contracts. Second, this question has attracted some attention in the bank loan
literature, which broadly focuses on interest rates, maturities, loan size and possible covenants, while leaving
the nature of collateral clauses in the background. However, due to the weakness of the credit environment in
transitional China, collateral requirements are common terms in bank loan contracts. Therefore, this paper
helps us to gain additional insights into the determinants of loan contracts in emerging and transitional econo-
mies such as China, which may diﬀer systematically from those predicted in developed economies.
From the perspectives of signaling theory and gender discrimination theory, we investigate the eﬀect of
CFO gender on the designing of collateral clauses in bank loan contracts and explore the potential path of
inﬂuence. Using a sample of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2012, we ﬁnd that CFO gender does aﬀect
bank loan contracts and that the collateral clauses granted to female-CFO-led companies are much stricter
than those granted to their male-CFO-led counterparts. In our sample, ﬁrms with female CFOs are less likely
to gain credit loans than ﬁrms with male CFOs and are more likely to be required to provide collateral if their
loan applications are approved. Furthermore, loans given to female-CFO-led companies are more likely to be
required to provide stricter pledging collateral or mortgaging collateral. On the contrary, loans given to male-
CFO-led companies are more likely to provide looser guaranteeing collateral. Our empirical results provide
support for the hypothesis of credit discrimination against female CFOs. Further analysis reveals that reform
through market-oriented ﬁnancial development helps to alleviate lending discrimination against female CFOs
in the Chinese credit market. In addition, compared with female CFOs in non-SOEs, female CFOs in SOEs
are less likely to suﬀer from gender discrimination in the credit market.
Our study makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it extends studies of the relationship
between accounting information and bank loan contracting. It is well established that banks are the most
important providers of external capital to corporations around the world. Accordingly, ﬁnance scholars have
devoted considerable eﬀort to understanding the factors that aﬀect bank loan terms. Studies show that bank
loan contracts are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by borrowers’ accounting quality and ﬁnancial reporting trans-
parency (Bharath et al., 2008; Armstrong et al., 2010), conservatism in ﬁnancial policies (Sunder et al.,
2009) and internal control weaknesses (Kim et al., 2011a), and country-level legal environments such as cred-
itor rights and legal enforcement (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009; Ge et al., 2012). This study
attempts to relate bank loan decisions to the gender of the top executives of borrowing ﬁrms, and focuses on
the eﬀects of female CFOs on the designing of collateral clauses from the perspectives of both signaling theory
and gender discrimination theory. Consistent with the gender discrimination hypothesis, our empirical results
suggest that bank loan contracts granted to female-CFO-led companies are more unfavorable than those
granted to male-CFO-led companies. In addition, regional ﬁnancial development is helpful in mitigating lend-
ing discrimination against female CFOs. Our study expands and deepens the theoretical understanding of the
determinants of bank loan contracts and provides evidence of the existence of gender discrimination in the
Chinese credit market.
Second, this study contributes to the gender literature. A proliferation of studies mainly focuses on the sys-
tematic diﬀerences between male and female executives in terms of their risk attitudes (Dwyer et al., 2002;
Atkinson et al., 2003), accounting and ﬁnancial policies (Huang and Kisgen, 2013; Francis et al., 2014), lead-
ership styles (Matsa and Miller, 2011) and agency costs and governance eﬃciency (Chava and Purnanandam,
2010; Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Rather than concentrating on internal corporate decisions, this study relates
the gender of top executives to banks’ lending decisions from an outside perspective and provides evidence
that CFO gender also greatly inﬂuences loan contracts, thereby expanding and furthering our understanding
of the economic consequences of female executives. In addition, despite increasing concerns over whether gen-
der plays a role in corporate decisions, the research has mainly focused on chief executive oﬃcers (CEOs) or
chairmen. To the best of our knowledge, this study is one of the few to concentrate on the role of female
CFOs.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section describes the theoretical model and
presents hypotheses for empirical testing. Section 3 outlines the sample and empirical research design. Section 4
presents the results. Section 5 discusses the implications of the ﬁndings and limitations of the study.
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2.1. Bank loan contracts
Banks are the dominant suppliers of external ﬁnance in most economies around the world (Graham et al.,
2008; Kim et al., 2011b) and thus play an important role in allocating capital to corporations (Francis et al.,
2012). The security market in transitional China is especially underdeveloped. As a result, the banking system
is much larger than the equity market, and ﬁrms rely heavily on bank loans for their external ﬁnancing needs.
Due to information asymmetry in the credit market, banks continually face severe default risk from borrow-
ers. In the bank loan literature, accounting information is the primary resource for banks to evaluate and pre-
dict the riskiness of borrowers (Anderson et al., 2004; Armstrong et al., 2010). For example, earlier studies
show a negative relationship between bank loan pricing and earnings quality (Bharath et al., 2008) and
conservatism (Zhang, 2008). Hasan et al. (2012) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with more predictable earnings have more
favorable loan contract terms. At the country level, Qian and Strahan (2007) indicate that borrowers in coun-
tries with strong creditor-protection environments enjoy loans with lower interest rates and longer maturities.
Although interest is an eﬀective way to price credit risk, it also presents negative moral hazard problems
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Therefore, collateral requirements along with interest rates, maturities, loan size
and possible covenants are common terms in bank loan contracts that compensate for higher default risks,
facilitate monitoring and limit potential losses (Jime´nez et al., 2006; Qian and Strahan, 2007). In practice,
bank loans can be divided into two categories, including credit loans and secured loans,3 based on whether
the borrowers are required to provide collateral. Collateral decreases the risk of debt in two important ways.
First, it facilitates enforcement against a defaulting debtor. In case of a default, the creditor can seize the
secured assets and satisfy the obligation. Second, it oﬀers protection against competing claims by other cred-
itors when an insolvent debtor faces liquidation. Collateral is therefore an important contractual device that
inﬂuences the behavior of borrowers and lenders and the design of debt contracts (Cerqueiro et al., 2015). In
fact, the use of collateral has become increasingly popular (Francis et al., 2012, 2013). According to Chen et al.
(2013), 74% of the bank loans granted to Chinese listed companies have introduced collateral terms. A series
of empirical results also show that collateral use is beneﬁcial in decreasing the information asymmetry risk
faced by commercial banks (Graham et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2011a).2.2. Female CFOs and bank loan contracts: based on signaling theory
The behavioral diﬀerences exhibited between women and men are generally non-controversial. Gender dif-
ferences in attitudes toward risk and risk-related behavior have long been studied in the sociology, psychology
and economics ﬁelds. Most studies have supported the notion that women are more risk-averse than men
(Knight, 2002). This gender diﬀerence is evidenced by the typically safer play behavior of girls relative to boys
and by women’s more cautious behavior relative to men in terms of sex, recreational drug use, alcohol con-
sumption, gambling and driving (Sapienza et al., 2009). According to ‘‘behavioral consistency theory,” indi-
viduals behave consistently across diﬀerent situations. Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that ﬁrms behave
consistently based on how their top executives behave personally. For example, looking at professional money
managers, Dwyer et al. (2002) ﬁnd that female managers take fewer risks than male managers in their mutual
fund investments.
Given the dramatic increase in female corporate executives over the past decade, a stream of studies con-
siders the eﬀect of the gender of top executives on various corporate decisions (Graham et al., 2013). For
instance, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) document that the introduction of mandatory board member gender quo-
tas led to increases in acquisitions and performance deterioration in Norwegian publicly traded ﬁrms. Faccio
et al. (2015) ﬁnd that ﬁrms run by female CEOs have lower leverage, less volatile earnings and a higher chance3 In light of the variance in binding strength of collateral agreements, there are three types of collateral forms: (1) guaranteeing collateral,
in which case a third party promises to bear the joint obligation when a borrower fails to repay a loan; (2) mortgaging collateral, which
requires the borrower or a third party to provide real property as collateral for the loan; and (3) pledging collateral, which requires the
borrower or a third party to provide movable property or a warrant as collateral for the loan.
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gender on corporate ﬁnancial decisions and indicate that ﬁrms under the control of female CFOs are less likely
to make signiﬁcant acquisitions and issue long-term debt. Furthermore, female CFOs are more likely to
decrease leverage levels than male CFOs. A more recent study by Francis et al. (2014) documents that female
CFOs tend to report more conservative accounting numbers than male CFOs. In addition, female CFOs
appear to make less risky ﬁnancing and investment decisions than their male counterparts. These results pro-
vide some supportive evidence that female CFOs are more risk-averse and conservative than male CFOs when
making corporate ﬁnancial decisions.
As mentioned previously, accounting information is a persistent standard that banks rely on to assess bor-
rowers’ credit risk. Studies have shown that when banks make lending decisions, they are very sensitive to var-
ious attributes of accounting information, such as operating accruals (Bharath et al., 2008) and conservatism
(Sunder et al., 2009; Zhang, 2008). Based on signaling theory, assuming that female CFOs are more likely to
report high-quality earnings and adopt conservative ﬁnancial policies than male CFOs, as documented in ear-
lier studies, banks should realize the beneﬁts of female CFOs in providing more reliable and conservative
accounting information to lenders. Thus, we conjecture that banks should acknowledge the positive gender
eﬀect and reward borrowing ﬁrms under the control of female CFOs with more favorable lending terms.
In addition to the risk associated with the availability of credible information, bank loan decisions are inﬂu-
enced by agency risk, which is mainly derived from the opportunistic activities of borrowers (Chava et al.,
2009; Ge et al., 2012). Corporate executives are supposed to act in the interests of shareholders, but not nec-
essarily in the interests of debt holders. Agency theory of debt implies that shareholders have incentives to
transfer wealth from debt holders to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The business ethics literature
normally suggests that women are more ethical than men in their attitudes and behavior (Ruegger and King,
1992; Nguyen et al., 2008). As a result of these personality characteristics, female executives are generally less
likely to exhibit opportunistic behavior than their male counterparts (Srinidhi et al., 2011). Based on this logic,
borrowers with female CFOs enjoy more favorable loan terms than those without female CFOs, as female
CFOs help to mitigate conﬂict between shareholders and debt holders and thus decrease the default risk ex
post.
Banks should collectively recognize the beneﬁts of female CFOs in decreasing information risk ex ante and
default risk ex post and reward borrowers under the control of female CFOs with more favorable loan con-
tract terms. The empirical research also provides proof of this judgment. For example, using a sample of S&P
1500 companies from 1994 to 2006, Francis et al. (2013) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with female CFOs enjoy bank loan
prices about 14 basis points lower on average than ﬁrms with male CFOs. In addition, loans granted to
female-CFO-led companies have 9% longer maturities and are about 8% less likely to be required to provide
collateral than loans granted to male-CFO-led companies.
Based on the aforementioned analysis, we argue that the transmission of ﬁnancial conservatism signals in
the credit market is a possible mechanism through which CFO gender inﬂuences bank lending decisions. Thus,
we propose our ﬁrst research hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 1. According to signaling theory, all else being equal, banks grant borrowers with female CFOs
more favorable loan contract terms than borrowers with male CFOs.2.3. Female CFOs and bank loan contracts: based on gender discrimination theory
Although default risk is the key determinant of loan contracts, many studies have also shown that females
are discriminated against in the credit market.4 Becker (1957) uses the term ‘‘taste-based” discrimination,
whereby minorities, low-income families and women, among others, receive disparate and less advantageous
treatment than their counterparts. A large number of investigations have focused on the role of race, ethnicity
and gender as determinants of credit applications, loan denials, charged interest rates and other types of4 Many studies have considered discrimination in the credit market. For a detailed survey of this literature, see a study by Blanch et al.
(2003).
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classical model proposed by Becker (1957), discrimination arises due to the taste-based preferences of the len-
der, who is willing to pay a price to avoid being associated with certain groups of borrowers. He also notes
that such discrimination tends to vanish with competition between lenders, as they are no longer able to bear
the cost of the non-economically motivated choices.
In terms of gender-based discrimination in the credit market, Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) report evidence of a
credit access gap between ﬁrms owned by white males and white females in the United States. Using the cross-
country Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), Muravyev et al. (2009) also note
that female-managed ﬁrms are less likely to obtain bank loans than their male-managed counterparts. In addi-
tion, their analysis suggests that female entrepreneurs are charged higher interest rates when their loan appli-
cations are approved. Extending these studies, Ongena and Popov (2013) identify the causal eﬀect of gender
bias on access to ﬁnance through a cross-country sample and ﬁnd that female-owned ﬁrms in countries with a
higher gender bias are more frequently discouraged from applying for bank credit and more reliant on infor-
mal ﬁnance. They emphasize that these results are not driven by credit risk diﬀerences between female- and
male-owned ﬁrms in countries with high gender biases.
Gender discrimination is also a severe social problem in contemporary China. Despite the declaration that
women hold up half the sky, China has followed patrilineal rule and a male power system since ancient times.
As a result, women can only occupy a subordinate position in both their families and the social system.
Although the women’s revolution that accompanied the establishment of the People’s Republic of China
led to a great improvement in their social status, women continue to experience an obvious gender bias in
terms of job availability, promotion opportunities and social identity (Qing and Zheng, 2013). In fact, as a
defective social norm in China, gender discrimination has permeated into various social and economic activ-
ities. As a result, women must expend more eﬀort than their counterparts to achieve the same success. The
gender bias hypothesis simply implies that banks may charge higher loan prices and require tighter non-
price terms when lending to female-CFO-led companies.
However, social capital also plays an important role in ﬁnancial development (Guiso et al., 2004). Due to
the prevalence of ‘‘guanxi” and the weaker institutional environment in transitional China (Peng and Luo,
2000), the eﬀect of relational networks and social capital on corporate ﬁnancing behavior is more severe
and explicit (Talavera et al., 2012). In contrast to their male counterparts, women are much shier and more
reluctant to build relationship networks, which decreases the chances of success for female CFOs competing
for scarce ﬁnancial resources.
Taken together, we argue that gender bias is another possible substitutive mechanism through which CFO
gender aﬀects bank lending decisions. Thus, we propose our second research hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 2. According to gender discrimination theory, all else being equal, banks grant borrowers with
female CFOs more unfavorable loan contract terms than borrowers with male CFOs.3. Research design
3.1. Data and sample
The sample comprises A-share listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to
2012. According to our research objectives and consistent with similar studies, we select our sample based on
the following criteria. First, due to their speciﬁc capital structures and debt covenants, we exclude companies
in the banking, insurance and other ﬁnancial industries. Second, we exclude companies that also issue B and H
stocks to eliminate the eﬀects of ﬁnancial environment and regulatory policy on bank loan contracts. Third,
we exclude ﬁrm years in which no loans were provided by banks. Fourth, we exclude ﬁrms whose CFOs chan-
ged in a given year. Fifth, we exclude ﬁrm years if the data required to measure the ﬁrm-speciﬁc control vari-
ables are unavailable. These criteria ultimately yield 5312 ﬁrm-year observations. The gender information of
top executives is collected manually from annual reports, and the bank loan information is collected by hand
from borrowers’ annual report notes. Other accounting and ﬁnancial data are taken from the CSMAR and
WIND databases.
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable Deﬁnition
Dependent variables
Loan The total bank loan amount in billions of yuan at year-end
Collateral A dummy variable that equals 1 if the company obtains credit loans from banks in a given year and 0 otherwise
Collateral-ratio The ratio of the volume of secured loans to the total volume of bank loans
Pled-collateral The ratio of the volume of pledging collateral loans to the total volume of secured loans
Mort-collateral The ratio of the volume of mortgaging collateral loans to the total volume of secured loans
Guar-collateral The ratio of the volume of guaranteeing collateral loans to the total volume of secured loans
Independent test variables
CFO-gender A dummy variable that equals 1 if the CFO gender is female and 0 otherwise
Chair-gender A dummy variable that equals 1 if the chairman gender is female and 0 otherwise
CEO-gender A dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO gender is female and 0 otherwise
Control variables
Size A proxy variable for ﬁrm size, measured as the natural logarithm of the ﬁrm’s market value of equity at year-end
Lev A proxy variable for the leverage ratio, measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets
Tangible A proxy variable for the characteristics of the ﬁrm’s assets, measured as ﬁxed assets divided by total assets
Growth A proxy variable for growth opportunities, measured as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt divided
by total assets
ROA A proxy variable for proﬁtability, measured as the ratio of net income to total assets at year-end
INDDUM Indicator variables for industry membership, following the CSRC Industry Code (2001)
YDUM Year indicator variables that proxies for year-speciﬁc eﬀects
Conditioning variables
State A proxy variable for property rights that equals 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder of a listed ﬁrm is a (central or
local) government agency or government-controlled SOE and 0 otherwise
Market A proxy variable for the degree of province-level ﬁnancial marketization in China, which is one sub-index of the
Marketization index (Fan et al., 2011)
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Bank loan contracts include not only price terms (i.e., loan interest rates) but also non-price terms, such as
loan size, maturity, collateral requirements and restrictive covenants. In this study, we focus on the eﬀect of
gender on collateral terms. In particular, we construct three dependent variables to capture the characteristics
of the collateral clauses of bank loan contracts, denoted by Collateral, Collateral-ratio and Collateral-intensity,
respectively. The ﬁrst dependent variable is Collateral. It is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a
company obtains credit loans from banks in a given year and 0 otherwise. The second dependent variable is
Collateral-ratio, which is deﬁned as the proportion of the volume of secured loans to the total volume of bank
loans. Finally, the third dependent variable is Collateral-intensity, which represents the restrictive intensity of
the clauses of three diﬀerent types of collateral. In our main tests, we adopt Guar-collateral, Mort-collateral
and Pled-collateral to proxy for Collateral-intensity, which represents the ratio of the volume of guaranteeing,
mortgaging and pledging collateral loans to the total volume of secured loans, respectively. In our study, the
main independent variable is CFO-gender,5 which equals 1 if the CFO position is held by a female executive
and 0 otherwise. All of the variables are deﬁned in Table 1.3.3. Model speciﬁcation
We specify the following regression model to evaluate the eﬀect of CFO gender on the collateral terms of
bank loan contracts:5 In
Chair-
contraLoanContract ¼ aþ b1Gender þ b2Controlþ e ð1Þpractice, CEOs and chairmen take ultimate responsibility for corporate decisions. Therefore, in our robustness checks, we introduce
gender and CEO-gender as alternative testing variables to explore whether CEO and chairman gender inﬂuences bank loan
cts. However, we do not ﬁnd that the presence of female CEOs and chairmen aﬀects the collateral terms considered in our study.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Observations Mean Median Std. Q1 Q3
Panel A: Loan facility characteristics
Loan 5312 1.341 0.395 3.111 0.13 1.141
Collateral 5312 0.619 1 0.485 0 1
Collateral-ratio 5312 0.714 0.912 0.353 0.468 1
Mort-collateral 4912 0.402 0.235 0.358 0 0.629
Pled-collateral 4912 0.113 0 0.237 0 0.097
Guar-collateral 4912 0.485 0.505 0.384 0.026 0.868
Panel B: Borrowing ﬁrm characteristics
CFO-gender 5312 0.274 0 0.446 0 1
CEO-gender 5312 0.056 0 0.230 0 0
Chair-gender 5312 0.042 0 0.200 0 0
Size 5312 21.696 21.562 1.099 20.905 22.361
Leverage 5312 0.482 0.485 0.193 0.337 0.625
ROA 5312 0.051 0.047 0.087 0.021 0.081
Tangible 5312 0.255 0.228 0.165 0.124 0.366
State 5312 0.498 0 0.500 0 1
Growth 5312 1.738 1.469 0.889 1.167 2.000
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following three bank loan collateral measures: Collateral, Collateral-ratio or Collateral-intensity. The main test
variable, CFO-gender, represents the gender of the CFO of the borrowing ﬁrms. In a robustness test, we also
examine the eﬀects of CEO and chairman gender on the collateral terms.
Following studies of bank loan contracts (e.g., Francis et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2013), we control for several
ﬁrm characteristics that may aﬀect collateral terms in the regressions. We begin by using the natural logarithm
of a ﬁrm’s total assets to measure ﬁrm size. We use Growth, which is measured as the market value of equity
plus the book value of debt divided by the total assets, as a proxy for the ﬁrm’s growth opportunities. We also
control for Leverage, which is measured as long-term debt plus current debt divided by total assets; ROA,
which is measured as the ratio of net income to total assets; and Tangible, which is measured as ﬁxed assets
divided by total assets. We also introduce State into the regression model to control for the inﬂuence of the
nature of the ultimate owners on the bank loan contracts. In addition, to address potential endogeneity con-
cerns, all of the control variables used in this model take a lagged value of one year. Finally, we use industries
dummies to control for the potential diﬀerences in loan contracting across industries.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the main variables used in this study. As shown in Panel A of
Table 2, in our sample, the average loan amount is 1.341 billion yuan, and 61.9% of Chinese listed companies
obtained credit loans from banks. Looking at the bank loan characteristics, 71.4% of the loans in our sample
use collateral (security). Furthermore, the means of the Collateral-intensity measures such as Guar-collateral,
Mort-collateral and Pled-collateral are 0.485, 0.402 and 0.113, respectively. This suggests that guaranteeing
collateral is the most frequently used collateral mode and that pledging collateral is the least used.
According to Panel B of Table 2, the mean values of CFO-gender, CEO-gender and Chair-gender are 0.274,
0.056 and 0.042, respectively. These numbers indicate that 27.4% of the CFO positions of the companies in our
sample are held by woman, a ﬁgure much larger than the 4.9% ﬁgure found in the U.S. setting by Francis et al.
(2013). In addition to female CFOs, 5.6% of CEO positions and 4.2% of chairman positions are held by female
executives, respectively. Female executives account for more than one third of top management teams, imply-
ing that female executives are playing an increasingly important role in corporate decisions.
Table 3
Correlation matrix.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Loan 1.000
Collateral 0.324*** 1.000
Collateral-ratio 0.071*** 0.632*** 1.000
Guar-collateral 0.148*** 0.100*** 0.035** 1.000
Mort-collateral 0.180*** 0.141*** 0.089*** 0.806*** 1.000
Pled-collateral 0.047*** 0.063*** 0.084*** 0.328*** 0.293*** 1.000
CFO-gender 0.042*** 0.016* 0.029** 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.003 1.000
CEO-gender 0.028** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.004 0.052*** 1.000
Chair-gender 0.028** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.011 0.004 0.005 0.031** 0.202*** 1.000
Growth 0.277*** 0.091*** 0.001 0.031** 0.052*** 0.032** 0.001 0.017 0.001 1.000
Lev 0.604*** 0.105*** 0.103*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.004 0.065*** 0.010 0.003 0.149*** 1.000
Tangible 0.219*** 0.113*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.001 0.031** 0.046*** 0.001 0.093*** 1.000
Size 0.726*** 0.334*** 0.215*** 0.136*** 0.222*** 0.135*** 0.051*** 0.056*** 0.021 0.328*** 0.364*** 0.042*** 1.000
State 0.252*** 0.261*** 0.242*** 0.128*** 0.151*** 0.034** 0.057*** 0.073*** 0.032** 0.032** 0.252*** 0.162*** 0.319*** 1.000
ROA 0.084*** 0.045*** 0.113*** 0.028 0.003 0.051*** 0.001 0.005 0.016 0.119*** 0.243*** 0.134*** 0.095*** 0.050*** 1.000
Note: This table presents Spearman correlations of the main variables used in our analysis. All of the variables are deﬁned in Table 1.
* Represent signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Represent signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Represent signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Table 4
Univariate testing.
Variable Male CFO Female CFO Test of diﬀerence
N = 3856 N = 1456 Diﬀerence t-statistic
Loan 1.453 1.043 0.410 4.289***
Collateral 0.624 0.606 0.018 1.224
Collateral-ratio 0.708 0.731 0.023 2.135**
Mort-collateral 0.390 0.430 0.040 3.322***
Pled-collateral 0.112 0.114 0.001 0.212
Guar-collateral 0.496 0.454 0.041 3.415***
Size 21.731 21.603 0.127 3.775***
State 0.516 0.451 0.065 4.222***
Lev 0.490 0.462 0.028 4.757***
Growth 1.737 1.741 0.004 0.135
Tangible 0.255 0.255 0.000 0.072
ROA 0.051 0.051 0.000 0.096
Note: This table reports t-statistics for the diﬀerences in means of each variable across ﬁrms with male and female CFOs.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
162 X. Xu et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 153–173Table 3 reports a Spearman correlation matrix for the variables included in our regression analyses. Our
test variable CFO-gender is signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with our measure of bank loan amount (Loan)
and the indicator of the likelihood to obtain credit loans (Collateral). However, it displays a positive correla-
tion with the use of collateral requirements (Collateral-ratio), suggesting that ﬁrms with female CFOs are less
likely to obtain bank loans and especially credit loans than ﬁrms with male CFOs. In terms of the correlations
between CFO-gender and Collateral-intensity, CFO-gender is signiﬁcantly and negatively associated with Guar-
collateral but signiﬁcantly and positively associated with Mort-collateral. The coeﬃcient between CFO-gender
and Pled-collateral is also positive but not signiﬁcant. All of these results indicate that the loan contracts
granted to female-CFO-led companies are more rigid than those granted to male-CFO-led companies, which
provides preliminary support for the hypothesis about discrimination against female CFOs in bank lending
decisions.
In addition, Table 3 shows that although Loan has signiﬁcantly positive correlations with both Size and
State, Collateral has signiﬁcantly negative correlations with both Size and State. This implies that compared
with small-scale enterprises and non-SOEs, large-scale enterprises and SOEs obtain more bank loans and are
less likely to be required to provide collateral.4.2. Univariate testing
Table 4 provides univariate comparisons of the bank loan terms between ﬁrms with female CFOs and their
counterparts without female CFOs. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the mean of the loan amount for ﬁrms with
female CFOs is 1.043 billion yuan and that for ﬁrms with male CFOs is 1.453 billion yuan. The mean diﬀer-
ence is 0.410 and is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The Collateral-ratio means diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the
female- and male-CFO-led ﬁrms. On average, the borrowers with female CFOs are less likely to obtain credit
loans and thus have bigger proportions of secured loans than the borrowers with male CFOs. More impor-
tantly, the ﬁrms with female CFOs are signiﬁcantly more likely to use mortgaging collateral, and the ﬁrms
with male CFOs are more inclined to provide guaranteeing collateral. In terms of pledging collateral, we ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two types of sample ﬁrms. Table 4 also indicates no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in key ﬁrm characteristics such as asset size, growth opportunities and earnings capacity across the sub-
samples, which are the main predictors of loan default risk.
In summary, the univariate tests suggest that banks provide more favorable loan terms to borrowers with
male CFOs. The results also indicate that the diﬀerence in loan contracts between borrowers with and without
X. Xu et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 153–173 163female CFOs is not caused by variance in the loan default risk, but is rather derived from banks’ lending dis-
crimination against female CFOs. This provides further support for Hypothesis 2.4.3. Multivariate test results
We begin our multivariate regression tests by testing how female CFOs aﬀect bank loan contracts. We then
examine how regional ﬁnancial marketization relieves banks’ lending discrimination against ﬁrms with female
CFOs. Furthermore, we attempt to investigate whether the state-owned property right of borrowers is helpful
in alleviating credit discrimination against female CFOs. Finally, we conduct a series of robustness checks
using diﬀerent statistical methods, including Heckman’s two-stage approach, a propensity score-matching
approach and the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach.4.3.1. Female CFOs and bank loan contracts
Based on the preceding basic model, we explore the eﬀect of female CFOs on collateral terms using several
diﬀerent dependent variables. Table 5 reports the regression analysis results.
In Column (1) of Table 5, we test how the presence of a female CFO aﬀects a ﬁrm’s likelihood of obtaining
credit loans, using an OLS regression. The estimated coeﬃcient of CFO-gender equals 0.016 and is signiﬁ-
cant at the 5% level, indicating that ﬁrms with female CFOs are less likely to receive unsecured loans from
banks than ﬁrms with male CFOs. Using Collateral-ratio as the dependent variable, Column (3) of Table 5
shows that the regression coeﬃcient of CFO-gender is 0.026 and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Therefore, the
secured loan ratio of ﬁrms with female CFOs is signiﬁcantly larger than that of ﬁrms with male CFOs. In addi-
tion, to further investigate the inﬂuence of female CFOs on the Collateral-intensity of collateral terms, we
introduce the proxies of three collateral forms (i.e., Guar-collateral, Mort-collateral and Pled-collateral) indi-
vidually as dependent variables. As shown in Columns (6) and (7) of Table 5, the coeﬃcients of CFO-gender
are 0.031 and 0.026, respectively, and both are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Looking at Pled-collateral, the
coeﬃcient of CFO-gender is also positive but insigniﬁcant, perhaps because the number of pledging collateral
cases in our sample is too small.6 These results imply that ﬁrms with female CFOs are more likely than ﬁrms
with male CFOs to be required to provide mortgaging collateral, but less likely to use guaranteeing collateral.
Therefore, the restriction of collateral clauses granted to female-CFO-led companies is more rigid than those
granted to male-CFO-led companies. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is conﬁrmed.
In terms of the control variables, State is signiﬁcantly positively related to Collateral but signiﬁcantly neg-
atively related to Collateral-ratio. At the same time, the association between State and Guar-collateral is sig-
niﬁcantly negative and that between State andMort-collateral is signiﬁcantly positive. These results mean that
the property characteristics of borrowing ﬁrms have an important eﬀect on the designing of collateral terms in
bank loan contracts. In contrast to non-SOEs, it is much easier for SOEs to apply for credit loans from banks,
and SOEs also enjoy the beneﬁts of better collateral clauses. Our ﬁndings are consistent with those of Fang
(2007), who argues that ‘‘[t]here exists credit discrimination against private ﬁrms in Chinese bank loan deci-
sions.” Lu et al. (2012) also suggest that the big four state-owned banks still dominate the banking sector in
China, favor SOEs and private ﬁrms with political connections in their lending decisions and discriminate
against other non-SOEs such as small-town and village enterprises and other private ﬁrms.
In addition, as ﬁrm size increases, the probability of borrowers obtaining credit loans increases signiﬁcantly
and their secured loan ratios decrease signiﬁcantly. Moreover, large-size borrowing ﬁrms are inclined to adopt
guaranteeing collateral with looser restrictions. In contrast, small-size borrowing ﬁrms are more likely to
adopt mortgaging collateral with stronger constraints. These results are in line with the ﬁndings of Lin and
Sun (2005) and provide some evidence of the ﬁnancing dilemma faced by medium-sized and small enterprises
in China.
In the previous OLS regression, although we control for various observable ﬁrm characteristics that have
been widely used in other studies, unobservable time-invariant factors could nevertheless aﬀect the collateral6 Relative to the frequent use of mortgaging and guaranteeing collateral, pledging collateral is used far less often. In our sample, only
11.3% of the secured loans adopt pledging collateral.
Table 5
Eﬀect of female CFOs on the collateral terms of bank loan contracts.
Variables Collateral Collateral-ratio Collateral-intensity
Guar-collateral Mort-collateral Pled-collateral
OLS Fixed eﬀect OLS Fixed eﬀect OLS OLS OLS
Constant 15.918*** (17.49) 12.403*** (14.88) 2.323*** (20.54) 4.080*** (18.88) 0.617*** (4.61) 2.155*** (16.75) 0.537*** (6.49)
CFO-gender 0.016** (2.36) 0.038** (2.44) 0.036*** (2.97) 0.057*** (4.52) 0.031*** (2.67) 0.026*** (3.34) 0.004 (0.68)
Growth 0.024 (0.60) 0.011 (0.60) 0.023*** (3.92) 0.011*** (3.47) 0.003 (0.53) 0.013** (1.99) 0.009** (2.24)
Tangible 0.424* (1.83) 0.206*** (2.80) 0.135*** (4.94) 0.168*** (5.08) 0.028 (0.76) 0.151*** (4.17) 0.180*** (7.72)
Size 0.750*** (17.94) 0.573*** (14.28) 0.073*** (14.23) 0.055*** (12.18) 0.042*** (7.09) 0.071*** (12.37) 0.029*** (7.76)
Lev 0.058 (0.30) 0.064 (0.48) 0.358*** (12.93) 0.229*** (9.56) 0.048 (1.47) 0.038 (1.22) 0.009 (0.48)
State 0.863*** (12.43) 1.026*** (16.55) 0.163*** (16.39) 0.144*** (13.82) 0.087*** (7.40) 0.080*** (7.10) 0.006 (0.93)
ROA 0.866** (2.19) 0.744*** (3.87) 0.195*** (3.47) 0.173*** (3.20) 0.113* (1.75) 0.093 (1.49) 0.020 (0.51)
Industry Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 5312 5312 5312 5312 4912 4912 4912
Adj/Pseudo R2 0.151 0.122 0.159 0.225 0.077 0.127 0.077
Note: This table presents the OLS and ﬁrm- and year-ﬁxed-eﬀect regression results for the eﬀect of female CFOs on the collateral terms. All of the variables are deﬁned in Table 1. The
absolute values of the heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics or z-statistics are in parentheses.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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X. Xu et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 153–173 165terms of bank loan contracts. For example, ﬁrms with female CFOs probably behave worse in terms of prof-
itability and thus have greater default risks, inducing banks to decrease their credit loans and claim stronger
collateral constraints. This eﬀect is caused by the borrowers’ characteristics rather than gender discrimination
in the credit market. To deal with this issue, we apply a ﬁxed-eﬀect regression to Eq. (1). The results are shown
in Columns (2) and (4) of Table 5. After controlling for the ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects, the eﬀect of female
CFOs on ﬁrms’ likelihood of obtaining credit loans increases to 0.038 from 0.016, and its eﬀect on the secured
loan ratios increases to 0.057 from 0.036. Both eﬀects remain economically and statistically signiﬁcant.
Taken together, the results in Table 5 indicate that CFO gender does matter to bank loan contracts. Banks
tend to discriminate against female CFOs, grant ﬁrms with female CFOs unfavorable loan contracts and espe-
cially impose stronger restrictions on collateral clauses. The empirical results are consistent with Hypothesis 2.4.3.2. Does ﬁnancial development alleviate credit discrimination against female CFOs?
Many researchers concentrate on how cross-country diﬀerences in laws and their enforcement aﬀect bank
loan contracting and ﬁnd that institutional environments have an important eﬀect on bank loan terms (e.g.,
Bae and Goyal, 2009; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Ge et al., 2012). Although our previous test provides prelim-
inary support for the hypothesis about credit discrimination against female CFOs, such discrimination should
ultimately disappear with competition between lenders, as they are no longer able to bear the cost of non-
economically motivated choices (Becker, 1957; Muravyev et al., 2009). Consistent with the view that ﬁrms fac-
ing less product market competition are more likely to discriminate (Orley and Hannan, 1986; Kuhn and
Shen, 2013), we have good reason to believe that the enhancement of regional ﬁnancial marketization and
competition in the banking industry leads to a decrease in lending discrimination against female CFOs.
The degree of ﬁnancial marketization in diﬀerent regions (provinces) of China varies greatly and derives from
their great diﬀerentiation in geographical location, resource endowment and even public policy (Lu and Yao,
2004; Fan et al., 2011). This provides a unique scenario for determining whether improved ﬁnancial marke-
tization is beneﬁcial in decreasing gender discrimination in bank loan decisions.
To examine whether the association between female CFOs and the collateral features of loan contracts is
conditional on the development of a region’s ﬁnancial marketization, we add the interaction term of
CFO-gender and Market, which is the indicator variable for provincial-level ﬁnancial development, to
Eq. (1). Table 6 summarizes the results when we include the interaction term CFO-gender *Market in
Eq. (1). As shown in Column (1), CFO-gender is negatively associated with Collateral, and the associationTable 6
Female CFOs, regional ﬁnancial development and loan collateral.
Variable Collateral Collateral-ratio Collateral-intensity
Guar-collateral Mort-collateral Pled-collateral
Constant 16.063*** (17.38) 2.306*** (20.00) 0.725*** (5.31) 2.236*** (17.04) 0.446*** (5.34)
CFO-gender 0.110* (1.76) 0.042** (1.95) 0.017** (2.34) 0.040*** (2.80) 0.054 (1.04)
Market 0.024** (2.02) 0.001*** (3.72) 0.014*** (4.66) 0.011*** (3.84) 0.007*** (2.67)
CFO-gender * Market 0.011** (2.34) 0.002*** (3.96) 0.001** (2.18) 0.001** (2.28) 0.005 (1.15)
Growth 0.028 (0.49) 0.023*** (3.87) 0.006 (0.88) 0.015** (2.29) 0.008** (2.04)
Tangible 0.466** (1.99) 0.027 (0.86) 0.051 (1.34) 0.133*** (3.64) 0.184*** (7.87)
Size 0.746*** (17.85) 0.073*** (14.22) 0.041*** (6.90) 0.070*** (12.19) 0.029*** (7.78)
Lev 0.036 (0.19) 0.359*** (12.91) 0.062* (1.89) 0.050 (1.60) 0.011 (1.18)
State 0.882*** (12.53) 0.162*** (16.12) 0.096*** (8.10) 0.088*** (7.70) 0.008 (0.56)
ROA 0.839** (2.12) 0.196*** (3.49) 0.124* (1.89) 0.102* (1.64) 0.026 (0.65)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 5312 5312 4912 4912 4912
Adj/Pseudo R2 0.152 0.161 0.082 0.130 0.078
Note: The absolute values of the heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics or z-statistics are in parentheses.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
166 X. Xu et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 153–173is marginally signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The estimated coeﬃcient of the interaction term, CFO-
gender *Market, is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The results suggest that banks are less likely to oﬀer
credit loans to ﬁrms with female CFOs, and the eﬀect of female CFOs on ﬁrms’ likelihood of obtaining unse-
cured loans decreases with the development of regional ﬁnancial marketization. In Column (2) of Table 6, the
coeﬃcient of CFO-gender is 0.042, signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and the coeﬃcient of the interaction term
CFO-gender *Market is 0.002, signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The results indicate that banks tend to claim col-
lateral when lending to ﬁrms with female CFOs, and the eﬀect of female CFOs on the proportion of secured
loans is stronger in provinces with weak ﬁnancial marketization than in provinces with strong ﬁnancial
marketization.
Looking at Collateral-intensity, Columns (3)–(5) of Table 6 report the regression analysis results using
Guar-collateral, Mort-collateral and Pled-collateral as the dependent variables, respectively. The coeﬃcient
of the interaction term CFO-gender *Market is 0.001 in the Guar-collateral regression model, signiﬁcant at
the 5% level, and 0.001 in theMort-collateral regression model, signiﬁcant at the 5% level. These results indi-
cate that when the level of regional ﬁnancial marketization is low, the negative association between female
CFOs and the use of guaranteeing collateral and the positive association between female CFOs and the use
of guaranteeing collateral are signiﬁcantly enhanced. According to Column (5), the coeﬃcients of CFO-
gender and the interaction term are positive but not statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that the eﬀect of female
CFOs on the use of pledging collateral does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between ﬁrms in regions with diﬀerent
ﬁnancial development.
Taken together, the results in Table 6 indicate that the discrimination eﬀect against female CFOs on col-
lateral terms is more pronounced in regions with weak ﬁnancial marketization. In this sense, our ﬁndings sug-
gest that ﬁnancial marketization reform is beneﬁcial in alleviating gender discrimination against ﬁrms with
female CFOs in the Chinese credit market.
4.3.3. Do property rights matter to credit discrimination against female CFOs?
Although the number of collective, private and foreign banks has continued to grow in the past decade, the
banking sector in China is characterized by a lack of competition, the dominance of state-owned banks,7 lend-
ing discrimination against non-SOEs and a lending preference exhibited toward SOEs (Kim et al., 2015).
Many studies have noted that because of state or government interventions in the ﬁnancial markets, state-
owned banks favor SOEs and private ﬁrms with political connections in their lending decisions while discrim-
inating against other non-SOEs such as small-town and village enterprises and other private ﬁrms (Fang, 2007;
Lu et al., 2012). This means that banks consider the property right status of borrowers as a key factor in their
lending decisions and tend to oﬀer SOEs more favorable terms. Thus, we divide the sample into two categories
and go further to determine whether there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the gender discrimination eﬀect between
SOE and non-SOE borrowers.
Table 7 presents the regression results by group. In the non-SOE group, the regression coeﬃcient of CFO-
gender to Collateral and Collateral-ratio is 0.153 and 0.026, signiﬁcant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
However, in the SOE group, neither of the coeﬃcients is signiﬁcant. This means that non-SOEs with female
CFOs have a signiﬁcantly lower likelihood of obtaining unsecured loans than those with male CFOs. How-
ever, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between SOEs with female CFOs and those with male CFOs. When
the dependent variables are Guar-collateral, Mort-collateral and Pled-collateral, all of the regression coeﬃ-
cients of CFO-gender are signiﬁcant in the non-SOE subsample but insigniﬁcant in the SOE subsample, which
implies that the state-owned property of borrowing ﬁrms is also helpful in decreasing the gender discrimina-
tion in collateral clauses faced by female CFOs.
In summary, our ﬁndings indicate that the property right status of borrowing ﬁrms has an important inﬂu-
ence on the gender discrimination eﬀect in the credit market. Diﬀerent from the obvious discrimination shown
against female CFOs in non-SOE borrowers, the gender discrimination eﬀect in SOE borrowers is
insigniﬁcant.7 In China, the big four state-owned banks still dominate the banking sector, which include the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank
of China (BOC), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and People’s Construction Bank of China (CBC).
Table 7
Female CFOs, property rights and loan collateral.
Variable State-owned enterprises (N = 2647) Non-state-owned enterprises (N = 2665)
Collateral Collateral-
ratio
Collateral-intensity Collateral Collateral-
ratio
Collateral-intensity
Guar-
collateral
Mort-
collateral
Pled-
collateral
Guar-
collateral
Mort-
collateral
Pled-
collateral
Constant 22.318***
(14.34)
2.702***
(16.33)
0.213
(1.10)
1.977***
(10.89)
0.762***
(6.36)
11.48***
(9.57)
1.636***
(10.09)
1.020***
(5.21)
2.306***
(11.91)
0.286**
(2.39)
CFO-
gender
0.189 (1.63) 0.003 (0.24) 0.029
(1.62)
0.279 (1.63) 0.001 (0.14) 0.153*
(1.71)
0.026***
(3.02)
0.042***
(3.75)
0.025*** (2.68) 0.016***
(2.78)
Growth 0.165** (2.40) 0.039***
(4.08)
0.002 (0.25) 0.024**
(2.33)
0.022***
(3.14)
0.023
(0.44)
0.008
(1.10)
0.004 (0.43) 0.006
(0.68)
0.002 (0.39)
Tangible 1.407*** (3.91) 0.088*
(1.95)
0.029 (0.56) 0.135***
(2.71)
0.165***
(5.01)
0.004 (0.01) 0.017 (0.37) 0.045 (0.82) 0.150***(2.75) 0.195***
(5.79)
Size 1.088***
(15.63)
0.097***
(13.52)
0.028***
(3.44)
0.065***
(8.38)
0.037***
(7.13)
0.534***
(9.60)
0.041***
(5.61)
0.060***
(6.78)
0.079***
(8.91)
0.018***
(3.33)
Lev 0.026 (0.09) 0.427***
(9.90)
0.029 (0.58) 0.051
(1.08)
0.022 (0.70) 0.013 (0.050 0.290***
(7.94)
0.057 (1.29) 0.046
(1.06)
0.011
(0.40)
ROA 0.345 (0.61) 0.132***
(1.69)
0.193**
(2.19)
0.113 (1.37) 0.078 (1.46) 1.693***
(2.65)
0.271***
(3.32)
0.013 (0.14) 0.044 (0.46) 0.058
(0.98)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj/Pseudo
R2
0.176 0.142 0.093 0.095 0.121 0.072 0.073 0.077 0.118 0.050
Note: The absolute values of the heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics or z-statistics are in parentheses.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Table 8
Female CFOs and loan collaterals: Subsample regressions based on regional discrimination culture.
Variable Low-level discrimination regions High-level discrimination regions
Collateral-
ratio
Guar-
collateral
Mort-
collateral
Pled-
collateral
Collateral-
ratio
Guar-
collateral
Mort-
collateral
Pled-
collateral
Constant 2.630*** 0.605*** 2.018*** 0.413*** 2.057*** 482** 2.147*** 0.664***
(16.70) (3.30) (11.42) (3.74) (12.32) (2.48) (11.83) (4.84)
CFO-
gender
0.011 0.010 0.015 0.005 0.017** 0.056*** 0.039*** 0.018*
(0.85) (1.55) (0.96) (0.54) (2.17) (3.31) (3.45) (1.65)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry/
Year
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2,600 2,387 2,387 2,387 2,712 2,448 2,448 2,448
Adj-R2 0.190 0.092 0.133 0.059 0.138 0.085 0.134 0.085
Note: Due to limited space, the regression results of the control variables are omitted.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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We conduct the following robustness checks to improve the reliability of our empirical results.4.3.4.1. Further analysis of the gender discrimination eﬀect in bank loan contracts. Our earlier analysis indicates
that banks tend to oﬀer unfavorable collateral terms to borrowing ﬁrms under the control of female CFOs.
However, this may not be caused by the gender discrimination against female CFOs, but rather the banks’
rational evaluation of the diﬀerences in the decision-making abilities and default risk between male and female
CFOs. To address this concern and conﬁrm the existence of a gender discrimination eﬀect, we draw regional
discrimination culture into our analysis framework. As mentioned by Gao and Lin (2014), corporate decisions
are likely to be inﬂuenced by local cultural norms. In line with this argument, we conjecture that borrowing
ﬁrms in provinces with stronger gender discrimination cultures should exhibit more credit discrimination
against female CFOs.
Following the approach of Gao and Lin (2014), we use the province-level sex ratio at birth as a proxy of
local discrimination culture8 and divide our sample into two groups based on the mean value (high-level dis-
criminative regions vs. low-level discriminative regions). As shown in Table 8, the various collateral terms
granted to borrowers with female CFOs are more unfavorable than those granted to borrowers with male
CFOs in provinces with stronger gender discrimination. However, the diﬀerence between borrowers with
female CFOs and those with male CFOs in provinces with low-level gender discrimination is insigniﬁcant.
Sub-group regressions further indicate that the eﬀect of CFO gender on bank loan contracts is mainly a result
of the gender discrimination eﬀect, which is also consistent with the preceding prediction and provides further
support of Hypothesis 2.4.3.4.2. Test of potential endogeneity problems. Endogeneity is a large concern in the study of gender issues.
For instance, female CFOs may not be randomly assigned to ﬁrms. Firms with conservative ﬁnancial policies
and good credit records may be more likely to hire female CFOs. In addition, unobservable time-variant or8 Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in the traditional Chinese culture norms of ‘‘parental preference for sons so as to carry on the
family line.” At the same time, due to the strict family planning policy, many parents adopt inexpensive technology to screen the sex of a
fetus (Ultrasound B in particular) and perform sex-selective abortions, which leads to a severe sex ratio imbalance. More importantly,
there is great variation in the gender discrimination cultures across diﬀerent provinces in China. Relative to north China, discrimination
against girls is much more serious in south China, where the patriarchal clan culture prevails. Following the approach of Gao and Lin
(2014), we use the newborn male-to-female ratio as our primary measure of gender discrimination and ﬁnd that the top two provinces with
the highest sex ratios are Jiangxi (1.257) and Hainan (1.233) and that the two provinces with the lowest sex ratios are Xinjiang (1.060) and
Shaanxi (1.071).
Table 9
Female CFOs and loan collateral: Propensity score-matching results.
Variable Collateral Collateral-ratio Collateral-intensity
Guar-collateral Mort-collateral Pled-collateral
Constant 13.044*** (11.75) 1.965*** (13.11) 0.252*** (3.39) 1.833*** (10.94) 0.783*** (6.83)
CFO-gender 0.055** (2.37) 0.019*** (2.80) 0.025*** (2.93) 0.031*** (3.29) 0.001 (0.49)
Growth 0.052 (1.09) 0.005 (0.80) 0.009 (1.01) 0.011 (1.44) 0.002 (0.52)
Tangible 1.445*** (5.33) 0.106*** (2.77) 0.052 (1.11) 0.014 (0.33) 0.068** (2.29)
Size 0.604*** (11.60) 0.060*** (8.67) 0.031*** (3.70) 0.067*** (8.66) 0.045*** (8.47)
Lev 0.578** (2.45) 0.422*** (11.92) 0.013 (0.30) 0.085** (2.12) 0.139*** (5.09)
State 0.876*** (9.98) 0.172*** (12.92) 0.061*** (3.76) 0.093*** (6.16) 0.005 (0.54)
ROA 0.735 (1.56) 0.203*** (2.83) 0.139 (1.62) 0.110 (1.39) 0.025 (0.48)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2912 2912 2696 2696 2696
Adj/Pseudo R2 0.112 0.123 0.048 0.058 0.033
Note: This table presents the OLS and logit regressions results for the eﬀect of female CFOs on the various collateral terms of bank loans
by applying a propensity score-matching approach. The absolute values of the heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics or z-statistics are in
parentheses.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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problem makes our results hard to interpret. We conduct a series of econometric analyses to address potential
endogeneity issues.
First, to compare the two groups of ﬁrms (male- and female-CFO-led ﬁrms) fairly, we construct matched
male CFO ﬁrms using a propensity score-matching approach. Following Francis et al. (2013), we begin our
matching with a logistic regression of the female CFO dummy variable on industry, year, ﬁrm size and lever-
age. We then use the propensity scores obtained from the logistic estimation and perform a one-to-one
nearest-neighbor match with replacements. This procedure ensures that each female CFO ﬁrm is paired with
a male CFO ﬁrm. We then obtain a new pooled sample that includes 1456 observations with female CFOs and
1456 matched observations with male CFOs. As shown in Table 9, the collateral clauses given to ﬁrms with
female CFOs are more rigorous than those given to ﬁrms with male CFOs. The results are consistent with
those reported in Table 5, implying that the main conclusions remain qualitatively unchanged even when
we use alternative matching methods.
Second, we use Heckman’s two-stage self-selection model to control for the self-selection bias induced in a
ﬁrm’s choice to hire a female CFO. According to Gao and Lin (2014), ﬁrms in the provinces with stronger
gender discrimination have fewer female top managers. Similarity/attraction theory and many studies have
also suggested that ﬁrms are more likely to hire female CFOs when their boards of directors are dominated
by women (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Hence, we choose the sex ratio at birth (Sex-ratio) of the province
in which the ﬁrm is headquartered and the ratio of women members on the ﬁrm’s board of directors
(Female-director) as instrumental variables. We then estimate the 2SLS model based on Eq. (1).
In the ﬁrst stage, we run a probit regression using Female CFOs as the dependent variable. According to the
ﬁrst-stage regression results, the estimated coeﬃcients of Sex-ratio and Female-director are 0.507 and 0.817,
respectively. Both are signiﬁcant at the 1% level, suggesting that our selection of instrumental variables is rea-
sonable. In the second stage, we run OLS and logit regressions. As shown in Table 10, the estimated coeﬃ-
cients of CFO-gender in Columns (1)–(5) are 0.193, 0.406, 0.648, 1.246 and 0.597, respectively. They
are signiﬁcant at the 1% level, suggesting that our results hold after considering the endogeneity of the choice
of female CFOs.
Third, similar to Francis et al. (2013, 2014), we trace the ﬁrms that changed their CFOs from male to female
(treated group) and from male to male (control group) and apply the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach to mit-
igate any unobservable time-variant factors that may aﬀect the estimated inﬂuence of female CFOs.
Table 10
Female CFOs and loan collateral: Heckman two-stage model results.
Variable Collateral Collateral-ratio Collateral-intensity
Guar-collateral Mort-collateral Pled-collateral
Constant 1.615*** (7.30) 0.673*** (9.86) 0.722*** (7.67) 0.130*** (2.99) 0.408*** (5.50)
CFO-gender 0.193*** (5.40) 0.406*** (3.24) 0.648*** (3.75) 1.246*** (5.12) 0.597*** (4.38)
Growth 0.058*** (3.00) 0.006 (1.10) 0.015* (1.82) 0.018 (1.60) 0.003 (0.54)
Tangible 0.319*** (2.80) 0.096*** (2.78) 0.099** (2.03) 0.046 (0.69) 0.146*** (3.81)
Size 0.135*** (15.33) 0.082*** (16.68) 0.044*** (6.66) 0.065*** (7.95) 0.021*** (2.84)
Lev 0.003 (0.53) 0.195*** (5.50) 0.050 (1.05) 0.068 (1.15) 0.118** (2.23)
State 0.146*** (3.79) 0.129*** (10.84) 0.098 *** (6.00) 0.081*** (3.52) 0.017 (1.34)
ROA 0.393** (2.17) 0.366*** (6.54) 0.033 (0.43) 0.044 (0.41) 0.077 (1.27)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 4835 4835 4835 4835 4835
Adj/Pseudo R2 0.018 0.034 0.044 0.051 0.032
Note: This table presents the OLS and logit regressions results for the eﬀect of female CFOs on the various collateral terms of bank loans
by applying a 2SLS regression model. The absolute values of the heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics or z-statistics are in parentheses.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table 11
Female CFOs and loan collateral: Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence regression results.
Variable Collateral Collateral-ratio Collateral-intensity
Guar-collateral Mort-collateral Pled-collateral
Post 0.012 (0.58) 0.010 (0.67) 0.108 (1.22) 0.088 (0.40) 0.055 (0.72)
Post * CFO-gender 0.103** (2.33) 0.092*** (3.84) 0.612*** (3.55) 1.104*** (4.83) 0.511*** (4.03)
Controls Omitted
Obs. 310 310 310 310 310
Adj/Pseudo R2 0.056 0.101 0.094 0.088 0.067
Note: This table presents the OLS and logit regressions results for the eﬀect of female CFOs on the various collateral terms of bank loans
by applying the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach. Post is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the year is after the CFO transition year and 0
if the year is before the CFO transition year. CFO-gender is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CFO is female and 0 otherwise. Due to
limited space, all of the control variable regression results are omitted.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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to-male CFO transition on Collateral, is insigniﬁcant, indicating that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
likelihood of obtaining unsecured loans between the pre- and post-transition periods for the ﬁrms in the con-
trol group. The estimated coeﬃcient of the interaction term between Post and Female CFOs, which captures
the incremental eﬀect of male-to-female CFO transition on Collateral, is 0.103 and signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Hence, compared with male CFOs, female CFOs decrease their ﬁrms’ probability (10.3%) of gaining credit
loans signiﬁcantly after CFO transitions. Consistent results are also found in Columns (2)–(5) when we replace
the dependent variable with Collateral-ratio, Guar-collateral, Mort-collateral and Pled-collateral, respectively.
The results of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach demonstrate that our ﬁndings related to credit discrimina-
tion against female CFOs in collateral terms hold after considering the time-variant omitted variable bias. The
results also suggest that female CFOs decrease their ﬁrms’ likelihood of receiving unsecured loans and result in
much tighter collateral terms in their bank loan contracts.
4.3.4.3. Eﬀect of chairman and CEO gender. Considering that board chairmen and CEOs are the ultimate
decision makers on important corporate aﬀairs, we also conﬁrm the robustness of our results in a change
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loans. However, we do not ﬁnd that the presence of female chairmen and CEOs signiﬁcantly aﬀects the col-
lateral terms considered in our study, a ﬁnding similar to that of Huang and Kisgen (2013). In contrast with
chairmen or CEOs, CFOs are the real executants of corporate ﬁnancial policy and participate directly in
negotiations with lending oﬃcers. As such, banks view CFOs rather than CEOs or chairmen as the primary
executives who determine the quality of accounting information and default risk, which in turn aﬀects their
ﬁnal lending decisions. The results are consistent with recent studies that have found a strong relationship
between CFOs and the quality of ﬁrms’ accounting information and leverage levels (e.g., Jiang et al.,
2010). Of course, the number of ﬁrms led by female chairman or CEOs in our sample is limited, which
may also have some adverse eﬀect on the empirical results. Therefore, our research conclusions on this point
must be treated cautiously.
4.3.4.4. Additional collateral requirement terms. When signing loan contracts with borrowing ﬁrms, banks typ-
ically use collateral requirements together with other price and non-price terms, including interest rates, matu-
rities, loan size and possible covenants. At the same time, borrowers probably actively provide more collateral
to banks to seek favorable loan prices. To address this issue, we conduct an additional robustness test using
the ‘‘ﬁrm-year-bank loan case” observations as our sample. As ﬁrms do not typically disclose the detailed
information of each loan, we gather only 2854 observations. Although not tabulated for the sake of brevity,
the related results are qualitatively similar to those reported previously and thus provide additional support
for Hypothesis 2.
4.3.4.5. Monetary policy. Bank loan decisions are inﬂuenced by a country’s monetary policy to a great extent.
Thus, we introduce the variable of monetary policy into our analytical framework and investigate the eﬀect of
CFO gender on bank loan contracts under diﬀerent monetary policy conditions. Referring to the related lit-
erature, we adopt the annual rate of growth in broad money supply as our proxy for monetary policy. During
a period of tightening monetary policy, the loan contracts granted to ﬁrms with female CFOs are more unfa-
vorable than those granted to ﬁrms with male CFOs. On the contrary, CFO gender is not signiﬁcantly asso-
ciated with loan terms during a period of easing monetary policy. These results reﬂect that the loosening of
monetary policy can relieve the lending discrimination faced by female CFOs to some extent.
4.3.4.6. Marketization in allocation of credit funds. We also use the ‘‘marketization in allocation of credit
funds” index as a substitutive measurement for competition intensity in the banking industry. The regression
results (not tabulated for the sake of brevity) show that our inferences remain unchanged.
5. Conclusion
In this study, we examine whether CFO gender aﬀects bank–ﬁrm relationships and the designing of collat-
eral clauses in bank loan contracting. Based on both signaling theory and gender discrimination theory, we
propose two opposing hypotheses to explain the eﬀect of CFO gender on bank loan contracts and the poten-
tial paths of inﬂuence and then conduct empirical testing using data from Chinese listed companies. Our
empirical results support the hypothesis about gender discrimination in the credit market. In our sample, com-
pared with ﬁrms with male CFOs, ﬁrms with female CFOs face tighter credit availability and are more likely
to be required to provide collateral despite the approval of their loan applications. Furthermore, banks prefer
to claim mortgaging collateral when lending to companies under the control of female CFOs and are more
inclined to require guaranteeing collateral when lending to companies under the control of male CFOs. This
suggests that the collateral clauses granted to female CFOs are much more restricted than those granted to
male CFOs. Further analysis reveals that regional ﬁnancial development and the enhancement of competition
in the banking industry are beneﬁcial in alleviating lending discrimination against female CFOs. In addition,
female CFOs of SOEs are less likely to suﬀer from gender discrimination in the credit market than female
CFOs of non-SOEs.
Overall, our results suggest that banks do not recognize the beneﬁts of female CFOs in decreasing the
information risk ex ante and default risk ex post and reward them with more favorable loan contracts. On
172 X. Xu et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 153–173the contrary, banks discriminate against female CFOs in their loan decisions and thus claim much stricter col-
lateral when lending to ﬁrms under the control of female CFOs. Gender discrimination is a serious obstacle to
increasing the eﬃciency with which scarce credit resources are allocated and hurts the improvement of the
ﬁnancial market. In this sense, in addition to enhancing the legal institutions and ﬁnancial marketization,
eliminating the negative inﬂuence of gender discrimination and other unhealthy social norms is an urgent task
in the process of improving China’s ﬁnancial reforms. This study deepens and expands our understanding of
the determinants of bank loan contracts and contributes new knowledge to the gender literature. In addition,
our study of the eﬀect of gender discrimination provides a strong case for comprehending the important role
informal rules play in the corporate decisions made within China’s transitional economy.
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